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GROWING STRATEGY SETS IN REPEATED GAMES
DAIJIRO OKADAy AND ABRAHAM NEYMANz
Abstract. We consider a new type of restriction on strategy sets in repeated
games, growing strategy sets. We impose a restriction on the way the set of
strategies available to a player at each stage expands, possibly without bound,
but not as fast as unrestricted strategy sets. In this paper growing strategy sets
are deﬁned without regard to any speciﬁc complexity measure of strategies.
What is bounded is the rate of growth of the size of strategy set over time.
We then study an undiscounted inﬁnitely repeated two-person zero-sum
game in which the strategy set of player 1, the maximizer, expands “slowly”
while there is no restriction on player 2’s strategy space. Our main result is
that, if the number of strategies available to player 1 at stage t grows subexpo-
nentially with t, then player 2 has a pure optimal strategy and the value of the
game is the maxmin value of the stage game in pure actions, the lowest payoﬀ
that player 1 can guarantee for sure in one-shot game. This is a strong result
in that an optimal strategy in an inﬁnitely repeated game has, by deﬁnition,
a property that, for every " > 0, it holds player 1’s payoﬀ to at most the value
plus " after some stage.
We also brieﬂy discuss how a growing strategy set may arise as a result
of allowing strategic complexity, such as the size of automata, to grow with
the number of repetitions. (Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation
Number:)
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1. Introduction
Complexity of repeated games as a model of interactive decision making stems,
in part, from the richness of strategies that the theory allows players to choose
from. The number of theoretically possible strategies is double-exponential in the
number of repetitions. (See Section 2.2.) This is due to the fact that the number
of histories grows exponentially with the number of repetitions and also that we
count strategies that map histories into actions in all possible ways. Some strategies
are too complicated to admit a short and practically implementable description: a
short description of a strategy requires an eﬃcient encoding of histories, but some
histories may have no shorter descriptions than simply writing them out in their
entirety. These considerations motivate the study of how restricting strategies to
simple ones may aﬀect outcomes of repeated games.
Various methods of restricting strategies have been investigated: ﬁnite automata,
bounded recall, Turing machine etc. Each method captures a particular aspect of
complexity of strategies in repeated games.
1
An advantage of restricting strategies to those of ﬁxed ﬁnite complexity (e.g.,
number of states of ﬁnite automata or length of recall) is that the strategy sets
become ﬁnite sets and so the existence of the value and equilibrium is guaranteed,
and, in some cases one can even write down the payoﬀ matrix.
2
Some criticisms may be made of imposing exogenous bound of complexity. First,
measures of complexity may seem ad hoc, diﬀerent complexity measure leads to rad-
ically diﬀerent classiﬁcation of strategies (Stearns (1997)) and thus results obtained
may be sensitive to particular choice of complexity measure. Second, each measure
1See a survey by Kalai (1990). Also see Neyman (1997) for more recent results when com-
plexity bounds are exogenously given in contrast to the models of Rubinstein (1986) and Abreu
and Rubinstein (1988) in which there are no ﬁxed exogenous complexity bounds but the cost of
complexity is considered. We do not consider the cost of complexity. Strategy sets are exogenously
restricted and the restriction does not enter players’ preferences. One may think of exogenous
restriction as an extreme case of complexity cost: inﬁnite cost to use a strategy outside of the
restricted set. Our notions of optimal strategy, the value, and equilibrium outcomes are stan-
dard, i.e., it involves payoﬀ comparisons only. Trade oﬀ between cost of expanding computational
resource and attainable payoﬀs is an important topic of study.
2See an analysis of repeated prisoner’s dilemma with “memory zero” strategies by Aumann,
Cave, and Kurz as reported in Aumann (1981)GROWING STRATEGY SETS 3
captures only a speciﬁc aspect of complexity and ignores some other important
aspects of complexity such as amount of time required to determine an action at
each stage, and related to this, complexity of computing best response (Stearns
(1997), O’Connell and Stearns (1999), Gilboa (1988)). Papadimitriou (1992) ﬁnds
an interesting trade oﬀ between easy description and implementation of strategies
(bounded number of states of automata) versus the computational complexity of
ﬁnding best response among the restricted strategies.
To these we add one more item which is the motivation for the research reported
in this paper. Boundedly rational players are limited by the set of available (im-
plementable) strategies, but limitation may ease over time or there may not be a
drastic ﬁnite limit to the complexity for the entire horizon, possibly inﬁnite, of the
game. Computational resource may expand, e.g., by adding more memory over
time or by learning. Any model that captures these intuitions would impose some
restriction on the way the set of strategies available at each stage expands, possibly
without bound but not as fast as unrestricted strategy sets.
In light of the discussion in the last two paragraphs, we consider growing strategy
sets with an arbitrary restriction without regard to any speciﬁc complexity measure.
What is bounded is the rate of growth of the strategy sets over time. To be more
precise, we imagine player i with a restricted strategy set Ψi in a repeated game.
Nature of the restriction or complexity bound that results in Ψi is arbitrary. In
particular, Ψi may contain inﬁnite number of strategies including those that cannot
be implemented by any computer with ﬁnite memory. For each stage t of the
repeated game, we count the number of strategies in Ψi that look distinct to other
players up to that stage, Ãi(t). If Ψi is the unrestricted set itself, then, as mentioned
in the beginning, Ãi(t) is double-exponential in t. Thus it is of interest to study
how outcomes of repeated games are aﬀected by the condition on the rate of growth
of Ãi(t).
Since no structure is imposed on the strategies that belong to Ψi, it would be
diﬃcult to derive results that rely on an explicit construction of strategies. For this
reason, and as a ﬁrst undertaking in this line of research, we will study a simplest
model of repeated games with restricted strategy sets: repeated two-person zero-
sum games in which the strategy set of player 1, the maximizer, is restricted in4 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
the manner mentioned above while there is no restriction on player 2’s strategy
set. The payoﬀs in the repeated games are undiscounted. Under the condition
that Ãi(t), the cardinality of Ψi, grows subexponentially with t, we will show that
player 2 has a pure optimal strategy and the value of the game is the maxmin value
of the stage game in pure actions, the lowest payoﬀ that player 1 can guarantee
himself for sure in one-shot game. This is a strong result since an optimal strategy
in an inﬁnitely repeated game has, by deﬁnition, a property that, for every " > 0,
it holds player 1’s payoﬀ to at most the value plus " after some stage regardless
of player 1’s choice of strategy. Our justiﬁcation for studying the zero-sum case is
a standard one: individually rational levels of payoﬀ must be determined relative
to the restricted strategy sets which will provide a useful information when one
studies nonzero-sum games.
We will set the notation used throughout the paper and formalize the idea of
growing strategy set in Section 2. Some examples of growing strategy sets will also
be discussed in this section. Section 3 contains the main results. Some concluding
remarks are made in Section 4.
2. Strategies in Repeated Games






The set of players is N = f1;:::;ng. For each i 2 N, Ai is the set of actions
available to player i and gi : A1 £ ¢¢¢ £ An ! R is his payoﬀ function. Set
A = A1 £ ¢¢¢ £ An. We call G the stage game.
In a repeated games3, at each stage each player observes a history of actions by
all players and takes an action. Thus a pure strategy for player i is a mapping from
all possible histories to his actions. Formally, let H1 = f²g be the set of “the empty
history”, and, for each positive integer t > 1, let
Ht = A £ ¢¢¢ £ A | {z }
(t¡1)times
:
3In this paper we talk of the most basic model of repeated games, i.e., ones with complete
information, perfect monitoring and standard signaling.GROWING STRATEGY SETS 5
Then Ht represents the information available to each player at the beginning of
the t-th stage. Player i’s pure strategy in a repeated game is then a mapping
¾i : [1
t=0Ht ! Ai. Let Σi be the set of all pure strategies of player i.
There is an alternative way of representing a strategy in a repeated game. We
deﬁne player i’s strategy at the t-th stage to be a mapping ¾it : Ht ! Ai. Then
i’s strategy in the repeated game can be represented by a sequence ¾i1;¾i2;:::.
Denote by Σit the set of all ¾it’s. Then i’s strategy set is their Cartesian product
Σi1 £ Σi2 £ :::. We use the same symbol Σi to denote this product.4
A play of a repeated game is a sequence (a1;a2;:::) where at 2 A. An n-tuple
of strategies ¾ = (¾1;:::;¾n) 2 Σ1 £ :::;Σn recursively induces a play as follows.
a1(¾) = (¾1(²);:::;¾n(²))
at+1(¾) = (¾1(a1(¾);:::;at(¾));:::;¾n(a1(¾);:::;at(¾))):
We say that two strategies of a player i, ¾i and ¾0
i, are equivalent up to the t-th
stage if, for every (n ¡ 1)-tuple of other players’ strategies ¾¡i,
as(¾i;¾¡i) = as(¾0
i;¾¡i) for s = 1;:::;t:
If two strategies are equivalent up to the t-th stage for every t, then we simply say
they are equivalent.
2.2. Restricted Strategy Sets and Their Growth. Let us denote by mi the
number of actions available to player i, i.e., mi = jAij, and m = m1£¢¢¢£mn = jAj.
We note ﬁrst that the number of strategies available to player i in the ﬁrst t stages
of a repeated game is5
jΣi1j £ ¢¢¢ £ jΣitj = mm
0






This number is double exponential in t.
Suppose that player i has access to a restricted set of strategies, Ψi ½ Σi, due
to limitations on some aspects of complexity of his strategies. For each positive
4For ¾i 2 Σi, let ¾it be the restriction of ¾i to Ht. Then (¾i1;¾i2;:::) 2 Σi1 £ Σi2 £ :::.
Conversely, given (¾i1;¾i2;:::) 2 Σi1 £ Σi2 £ :::, let ¾i(h) = ¾it(h) for h 2 Ht. Then ¾i 2 Σi.
So the two ways of representing strategies are equivalent.





m¡i = £j6=imj.6 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
integer t, let Ψi(t) be formed by identifying strategies in Ψi that are equivalent up
to the t-th stage.6 Note that Ψi and Ψi(t) may not be expressed as a Cartesian
product as we did for Σi (= Σi1 £ Σi2 £ :::).
Let Ãi(t) be the number of elements in Ψi(t). Any consideration on strategic
complexity gives rise to a restricted strategy set Ψi and thus limitation on the rate
of growth of Ãi(t). For example, if player i is restricted to those strategies that can
be implemented by automata with a ﬁxed number of states, then Ψi is a ﬁnite set
and Ψi(t) = Ψi for all suﬃciently large7 t. In this case Ãi(t) = O(1).
We illustrate the concept of growing strategy sets in a few examples. These
examples are not meant to be realistic or theoretically useful, but rather to be an
aid to ﬁx the concept in readers mind more readily.
Example 1. For each t, let Ψit be a subset of Σit and Ãit = jΨitj. Deﬁne Ψi =
Ψi1 £ Ψi2 £ :::. Then Ψi(t) = Ψi1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Ψit and Ãi(t) = Ãi1 £ ¢¢¢ £ Ãit.
In all the examples that follow, consider a two person game in which each player
has two actions: N = f1;2g and A1 = A2 = f0;1g.
Example 2. For each positive integer k, deﬁne a strategy ¾
(k)
1 as follows. For each







1 if ·(h) ¸ k
0 otherwise:








1 g and Ãi(t) = t.
Example 3. A preﬁx of a history h = (h1;:::;ht) is any of its initial segment
h0 = (h1;:::;hs), s · t. A set of histories L ½ [1
t=1Ht is said to be preﬁx-free
if no element of L is a preﬁx of another. Now, for each positive integer t, let
L(t) ½ H1 [ ¢¢¢ [ Ht be preﬁx-free and L(t) ½ L(t + 1). Write ¸ for the sequence







1 if (h1;:::;hs) 2 L(t) for some s · t,
0 otherwise:
6If two strategies in Ψi are equivalent, then they are never distinguished in Ψi(t) for any t. So
the reader may consider Ψi to be the set of equivalence classes of strategies.
7In fact, this holds for all t ¸ m where m is the bound on the number of states of automata.GROWING STRATEGY SETS 7
This is a generalization of the trigger strategy: ¾¸
1 takes action 1 forever as soon
as a history in some L(t) occurs. Let L be the set of all increasing sequences of
preﬁx-free sets of histories. Take a subset M of L and deﬁne Ψ1 to be the set of
player 1’s strategies ¾¸
1 with ¸ 2 M. Let us examine Ψ1(t) and Ã1(t).




are equivalent up to the t-th stage if, and only if, L(t) = M(t). We say that ¸ and
¹ are equivalent up to the t-th stage if L(t) = M(t). This is an equivalence relation
on L, and hence on M. We denote by M(t) the set of the equivalence classes when
this relation is taken on M. For notational simplicity, the elements of M(t) will
be denoted by ¸, ¹ and so on as for the elements of M themselves. Then we have
Ψ1(t) = f¾¸
1 j¸ 2 M(t)g and Ã1(t) = jM(t)j:
Examples of M can be constructed as follows. Let f : N ! N be a nondecreasing
function and let M = f(L(t))t 2 LjjL(t)j = O(f(t))g. It is not diﬃcult to construct
examples of (L(t))t for which jL(t)j = O(t), O(tp) for each p > 1, and O(2®t) for
0 < ® < 1.
3. Some Results: Restricted vs. Unrestricted Players
We now derive a few consequences of restricting strategy sets in terms of the
growth rate of Ãi(t) = jΨi(t)j, which may be interpreted as the number of strate-
gies available to player i up to the t-th stage. We emphasize that the nature of the
restricted strategy set Ψi is completely arbitrary. It may include inﬁnitely many
strategies and also the strategies that cannot be represented by any ﬁnite state
machines or ﬁnitely bounded recall. As such, it is quite diﬃcult, if not impossi-
ble, to obtain results on optimal strategies or equilibrium payoﬀs which require
examination and construction of speciﬁc strategies. In what follows we study what
may appear to be an extreme case of repeated games with strategy restriction: a
two-person zero-sum inﬁnitely repeated game with no discounting of payoﬀs and
only one of the players (player 1, the maximizer) has a restricted strategy set and
plays against the unrestricted player (player 2).8 Although the repeated game we
study in this paper is rather special, our results apply to any measure of strategic
8Although mixed strategies are not used in our results, we allow the players to use them.
The choice of a strategy, according to some probability distribution, is performed before the game8 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
complexity that gives rise to a restricted strategy set satisfying our condition on
the rate of growth Ã1(t).
Let w be player 1’s maxmin payoﬀ in the stage game where max and min are
taken over the pure actions: w = maxa12A1 mina22A2 g(a1;a2). This is the worst
payoﬀ that player 1 can guarantee himself for sure in the stage game. For a pair of
repeated game strategies (¾1;¾2) 2 Σ1 £ Σ2, we write gt(¾1;¾2) for the player 1’s
average payoﬀ up to the t-th stage.
3.1. Finite Set of Strategies. If the restricted strategy set Ψ1 is a ﬁnite set,
then it is obvious that the unrestricted player 2 can construct a strategy, say ¾¤
2,
which eventually identiﬁes the strategy chosen by player 1 and gives him at most
w at each stage thereafter.9 Therefore gt(¾1;¾¤
2) converges to w for every ¾1 2 Ψ1.
The ﬁrst proposition provides its speed of convergence. It has appeared in Neyman
and Okada (2000) in a study of nonzero-sum two person ﬁnitely repeated games
with ﬁnite automata. In order to make this paper self-contained, and, since this
proposition will be used in the proof of the second proposition, we will give the
proof.
Proposition 1. For every ﬁnite subset Ψ1 of Σ1 there exists ¾¤
2 2 Σ2 such that for
all ¾1 2 Ψ1
gt(¾1;¾¤
2) · w + kgk
log2jΨ1j
t
for all t = 1;2;:::
where kgk = maxfg(a1;a2)ja1 2 A1;a2 2 A2g.
Proof: For each history h = (h1;:::;ht¡1), where hs = (a1s;a2s), let Ψh
1 be the
set of strategies in Ψ1 that are compatible with h. That is,
Ψh
1 = f¾1 2 Ψj¾1(²) = a11; and
¾1(h1;:::;hs¡1) = a1s for all s = 2;:::;t ¡ 1:g
For each a1 2 A1 let Ψ
h;a1
1 be the set of strategies in Ψh
1 that takes the action






1 j¾1(h) = a1
ª
:
starts. Note that when strategy set is restricted, certain behavioral strategies may not be available
to the player if they are not equivalent to mixtures of available pure strategies.
9Ben-Porath (1993)[Lemma 1, Theorem 1] provides an explicit construction of such strategy
when the restriction is in terms of ﬁnite automata.GROWING STRATEGY SETS 9






















1 ja1 2 A1
ª
is a partition of Ψh



























whenever ht 6= (a1(h); ¢).
Fix ¾1 2 Ψ1 and let (h1;h2;:::), where hs = (a1s;a2s), be the play generated
by (¾1;¾¤





1 if a1s 6= a1(h1;:::;hs¡1)
0 otherwise;















This means that the number of stages at which player 1’s action diﬀers from















(1 ¡ Is)w + kgkIs
¢






This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
3.2. Inﬁnite Ψ1 for which Ã1(t) grows slowly. Next we consider an inﬁnite
strategy set Ψ1. Recall that Ψ1(t) is formed by identifying strategies in Ψ1 that





Proposition 2. Suppose that logÃ1(t)=t ! 0 as t ! 1. Then there is a strategy
¾¤




2) · w:10 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
Thus, if the growth rate of Ã1(t) is subexponential in t, then player 2 can guar-
antee not to give player 1 more than w in the long run. Note that whether player 1
can attain exactly w or not depends on what strategies are in Ψ1. For example, if
a¤ = argmaxa(minb g(a;b)), and a strategy that takes a¤ in every stage is available,
then w can be achieved by using such strategy. We ﬁrst present a lemma whose
proof is found in the appendix.
Lemma 1. If logÃ1(t)=t ! 0 as t ! 1, then there is an increasing sequence of








! 0 as k ! 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ftkg1
k=1 be a sequence satisfying the properties (A)
and (B) of Lemma 1. Call a consecutive stages tk + 1;:::;tk+1 of the repeated
game the k-th block.
The construction of player 2’s strategy ¾¤
2 is similar to the one in the proof
of Proposition 1. Given a history h = (h1;:::;ht¡1), there is a unique k with
tk · t < tk+1. Let Ψh
1(tk+1) be the set of player 1’s strategies in Ψ1(tk+1) that are
compatible with h and, for each a1 2 A1, set
Ψ
h;a1
1 (tk+1) = f¾1 2 Ψh
1(tk+1) j ¾1(h) = a1g:












2 plays the strategy constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 against
Ψh
1(tk+1) during the k-th block.













Take t > 4tk0=" and let ¯ k be the smallest index k for which tk > "t=4. Then, ¯ k > k0
and t¯ k¡1 < "t=4 < t¯ k. See the ﬁgure above.GROWING STRATEGY SETS 11
-
t tk0 t¯ k t¯ k+1 "t=4
-
t t¯ k t¯ k+1 t¯ k+2 t¯ k+d ¢¢¢
¢¢¢




1 (tk+1) ½ Ψ1(tk+1) whenever tk+1 · t · tk+1. The average payoﬀ






















t¯ k ¡ ("t=4) + ("t=4)
t
·



























The deﬁnition of ¾¤
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Therefore, gt(¾1;¾¤
2) < w + ". Q.E.D.
When Ψi is a Cartesian product, as in Example 1, the construction of ¾¤
2 is
















¯. Then, Ãi(t) ¸ 2n(t).
Thus log2 Ãi(t)=t ! 0 (as t ! 1) implies that n(t)=t ! 0 (as t ! 1). For each







argmina22A2 g(¾1t(h);a2) if Ψit = f¾itg
arbitrary action if
¯ ¯Ψis









kgk ! w as t ! 1:
3.3. Entropy and Growing Strategy Sets. In this section we prove a gener-
alization of Proposition 2 for the case when logÃ1(t)=t converges to an arbitrary
positive number. To do this we will use the concept of entropy and its properties
which we will now introduce.
Let X be a random variable that takes values in a ﬁnite set Ω and let p(x) denote
the probability that X = x for each x 2 Ω. Then the entropy of X is deﬁned as





The entropy of a vector of random variables, H(X1;¢¢¢ ;Xn), is similarly deﬁned.
The conditional entropy of a random variable X given another random variable
Y is deﬁned as follows. Given the event Y = y, let H(Xjy) be the entropy of X





Then the conditional entropy of X given Y is the expected value of H(Xjy) with
respect to the (marginal) distribution of Y :
H(XjY ) = EY [H(Xjy)] =
X
y
p(y)H(Xjy):GROWING STRATEGY SETS 13
The following “chain rule” for entropy, which we will use in the proof of the next
theorem, is easy to verify. See Cover and Thomas (1991).
Lemma 2. H(X1;¢¢¢ ;XT) = H(X1) +
PT
t=2 H(XtjX1;¢¢¢ ;Xt¡1).
Let (Ω;F;¹) be a probability space and let P be a ﬁnite partition of Ω into sets





It is easy to see that if Q is a reﬁnement of P, then H¹(P) · H¹(Q).
Given a restricted strategy set of player 1, Ψ1 ½ Σ1, we have deﬁned, for each t,
the set Ψ1(t) to be the partition of Ψ1 induced by an equivalence of pure strategies.




t ¾0 () 8¿ 2 Σ2; as(¾;¿) = as(¾;¿) for s = 1;:::;t:
Then Ψ1(t) = Ψ1=»
t .





¾0 () as(¾;¿) = as(¾;¿) for s = 1;:::;t:
and let Ψ1(t;¿) = Ψ1= »
t;¿. Clearly Ψ1(t;¿) is a ﬁnite partition of Ψ1 and Ψ1(t) is its
reﬁnement. Hence, by the property of the entropy of partitions mentioned above,
(4) H¾(Ψ1(t;¿)) · H¾(Ψ1(t)) · logjΨ1(t)j = logÃ(t):
By the deﬁnition of the equivalence relation deﬁning Ψ1(t;¿), each equivalence
class S 2 Ψ1(t;¿) is associated with a history of length t, h(S) 2 Ht. More precisely,
h(S) is the history of length t which results when the strategy proﬁle (s;¿) is played,
for any s 2 S. Conversely, for any history h 2 Ht, there is an equivalence class
S 2 Ψ1(t;¿) such that h = h(S). Clearly, this correspondence between Ψ1(t;¿) and
Ht is one-to-one. Furthermore, the event “a strategy s 2 S ½ Ψ1(t;¿) is selected
by ¾” is equivalent to the event “the history h(S) occurs when (¾;¿) is played”.
Therefore,
¾(S) = P¾;¿(h(S)):
Let us write X1;:::;Xt for the sequence of action proﬁles up to stage t when (¾;¿)
is played. So it is a random vector with distribution P¾;¿. Then the observation in14 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN










Combining this equality with (4) we have
Lemma 3. Let ¾ 2 ∆(Ψ1) and ¿ 2 Σ2 and (X1;:::;Xt) be the random play up to
stage t induced by (¾;¿). Then, for every t,
H(X1;:::;Xt) · logÃ1(t):












Thus U(x) is what player 1 can secure in the stage game G using a mixed action
of entropy at most x. Clearly, U(0) = w, the maximin value in pure actions. Let
cav U be the concaviﬁcation of U, i.e., the smallest concave function which is at
least as large as U at every point of its domain.
Theorem 1. Suppose that limsupt!1
logÃ(t)
t
= x. Then, for every ¾ 2 ∆(Ψ1),
there is ¿ 2 Σ2 such that
limsup
t!1
gt(¾;¿) · (cav U)(x):
Proof: Fix player 1’s strategy ¾ 2 ∆(Ψ1). For the purpose of the payoﬀ calcula-
tion, identify ¾ with its equivalent behavioral strategy. Deﬁne player 2’s strategy
as follows. At each stage t, and at each history h 2 Ht¡1, ¿(h) minimizes player
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Let X1;X2;¢¢¢ be the sequence of random actions induced by (¾;¿). Let H(Xtjh)
be the entropy of Xt given that a history h is realized. Note that, conditional on
the history h, the entropy of player 1’s mixed action at stage t is H(Xtjh). Hence,
by the deﬁnitions of U, cav U, and ¿, we have
E¾;¿[g(Xt)jh] · U(H(Xtjh)) · (cav U)(H(Xtjh)):
Taking the expectation, we have
E¾;¿[g(Xt)] · E¾;¿[(cav U)(H(Xtjh))] · (cav U)(E¾;¿[h(Xtjh)])
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of cav U and Jensen’s in-









































The second inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. The second and the third
equalities follow from the deﬁnition of conditional entropy and Lemma 2, respec-
tively. The last inequality follows from Lemma 3. Since limsupT!1(Ã1(T)=T) = x,
the last term in the above inequality is at most x for all suﬃciently large T. This
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
As in Proposition 2, whether player 1 can achieve (cav U)(x) or not depends on
what strategies are available to him.16 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
4. Concluding Remarks
In this section we brieﬂy discuss growing strategy sets arising from growing com-
plexity bounds. Let m1;m2;::: be a nondecreasing sequence of positive integers.
Let Ψi be the set of player i’s strategies such that the strategies belonging to the set
Ψi(t), as deﬁned in Section 2, are all implementable by automata with at most mt
states. It is easily seen that, if mt0 = mt0+1 for some t0, then Ψi(t) = Ψi(t0) for all
t > t0. Thus in order to obtain a growing strategy set with this method, one must
allow mt ¸ t for all t. That is, the number of states must grow at least as fast as
the number of repetitions. A similar conclusion applies to bounded recall strategies
since any such strategy can be represented by ﬁnite automata. See Neyman (1997).
Perhaps closest in spirit to this paper is O’Connell and Stearns (1999). In their
model, player 1 chooses a set of K pure strategies which can be randomized. The
number K is exogenously given. There is no other restriction on player 1’s strat-
egy set, or, choice of strategy set. Player 2, whose strategies are not restricted,
is informed of the set chosen by player 1. Thereafter they start playing an undis-
counted ﬁnitely repeated game. This is a fairly general set up for studying strategic
complexity in repeated games. For whenever one limits a complexity of strategy
such as the number of states of ﬁnite automata or the length of recall, one puts a
bound on the number of possible pure strategies that conform to the restriction.
They address important issues mentioned in the third paragraph in Section 1: the
amount of memory and time needed to implement/execute strategies. They ex-
plicitly present an algorithm to compute an optimal set of K pure strategies for
player 1 and show that the algorithm runs in a polynomial time in K. They also
show that, for 2£k games, one can encode the optimal set almost optimally using
approximately log2 K bits, and, one can execute each pure strategy in an optimal
set by spending a ﬁxed amount of time at each stage and a ﬁxed amount of memory
during the entire game which is independent of K and of the number of repetitions.
They also provide upper and lower bounds, with respect to K, on the value of the
repeated game.GROWING STRATEGY SETS 17
Appendix
We rephrase the lemma by setting »t = log2 Ã1(t).
Lemma 1 Let f»tg1
t=1 be an increasing sequence of positive integers with the prop-










! 0 as k ! 1.

















. It is easily veriﬁed
that, under the hypothesis of this lemma, this function has the following properties.
(In fact, (c) implies (b).)








! 0 as t ! 1.
Choose a ¯ 2 (0;1). Set t1 > 1 arbitrarily and deﬁne by induction




where [x] denotes the integer part of x. Property (b) of f ensures that ftkg1
k=0 is





f(tk)¯ ! 0 as k ! 1:
To show that the sequence ftkg1



















tk ¡ f(tk)¯ ¢
f(tk)¯
f(tk+1)18 D. OKADA AND A. NEYMAN
holds for all suﬃciently large k. Note that
tk+1























! 1 as k ! 1,








f(tk)1¡¯ ! 0 as k ! 1
by (a) and since f(tk+1) ¸ f(tk). This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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